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tax notes®

·- 'ritermountain and the Importance
Of Administrative Law in Tax Law

y!:·; .

By Steve R. Johnson

On September 29, 2009, Treasury issued regulations
retroactively1 extending the six-year limitations period
for income tax deficiencies resulting from basis overstatements.2 In its May 6 Intermountain decision, the Tax Court
tmanimously invalidated those regulations, but on divided rationales.3 The government has appealed.
lntermountain is a must-read for tax academics and
practitioners. It is among the richest decisions on the
procedural and substantive valid ity of tax regulations.4
Moreover, the opinions in the case, subsequent cases on
the issue, .and commentary on these opinions and cases
present genuine opportunity for improvement of the law.
This report has five sections. Section I sketches the
growing significance of administrative law in tax law.
The days of comfortable insularity are drawing to a close.
To maintain; dexterity in the years to come, tax practi~
tioners and tax scholars will increasingly need to possess
competence in broader principles of administrative law.
Intemwuntain is a harbinger of that growing necessity.
Section II describes the background of the case, summarizes the three opinions rendered in it, and evaluates the
result reach ed. I think that the Intermountain result is
correct but (in terms of the arguments in the opinions)
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1Although the regulations apply to returns for years before
2009, the IRS denies that they are retroactive, reasorung that a
regulation has retroactive effect only if it would impair a party's
rights, increase his liability for past conduct, or impose new
duties ~s to conduct already completed, none of which the regs
do, according to the IRS. Respondent's brief in support of
motion to vacate order and, decision, Intermo1mtain Ins. Serv. of
Vail LLC, Tl1omas A. Davies, Tax Matters Partner v. Commissioner,
134 T.C. No. 11, at 7-10 Gan. 5, 2010), Doc 2010-10163, 2010 TNT
88-12, (hereafter "IRS brief"). The IRS further contends that the
regulations, even if they are retroactive, are valid under the
effective date of section 7805(b) and the "prevention of abuse"
exception of section 7805(b)(3). Id. at 10-13.
2Temp. reg. sections 301.6229(c)(2)-IT and 301.6501(e)-IT.
3 lntennountain, supra note 1, appeal docketed, No. 10-1204 (D.C.
Cir. July 30, 2010).
.
.
4Illustrating the pace at which this area is developing,
another important administrative law tax case, Swallows Holding, preceded Intennountnin by only a few years. Swallows
Holding Ltd. v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 6 (2006), Doc 2006-1541,
2006 TNT18-10, rev'd, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008), Doc 2008-3372,
2008 TNT 33-41. For discussion of Swallows Holding, see Steve R.
Johnson, "Swallows as It Might Have Been: Regulations Revising
Case Law," Tax Notes, Aug. 28, 2006, p. 773, Doc 2006-14217, or
2006 TNT 167-105; Johnson, "Swallows Holding as It Is: The
Distortion of National M11fjler," Tax Notes, July 24, 2006, p. 351,
Doc 2006-13093, or 2006 TNT 142-37.
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only on the procedural gronnd advanced by two concurring judges: that the regulations violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for failure to satisfy the noticeand-comment requirements.
Sections ID, IV, and V address some important aspects
of Intermountain. My treatment is selective. Leaving some
material for future discussion, I delve into three of the
interesting veins of the case, including issues appearing
in the opinions as well as issues omitted from them.
Section Ill discusses whether the regulations at issue
in the case are legislative or interpretive in nature. This
matters to the APA argument. Unless another exception
applies (and none does in Intermountain), legislative
regulations must go through notice-and-comment, but
interpretive regulations need not. I conclude that the
challenged regulations are legislative, and I urge tax
practitioners to refine their definitions of legislative and
interpretive regulations.
Section IV examines the light shed by Intermountain on
the Brand X rule as to when agency rulemaking may
displace prior judicial interpretations of statutes.5 I conclude that Intermountain and similar cases may help at
one level: whether "magic words" must appear in the
judicial interpretations. However, they are unlikely to
help at two other levels: what should be done if the
precedents' characterizations are rmsupportable, and
whether the Brand X analysis of the rmderlying statute
turns on the statute's language or also embraces pertinent legislative history.
Section V explores two arguments that weren't considered in the Intermountain opinions but that might be
brought against the temporary regulations in future
cases. One such argwnent is that the temporary regulations have not gone through the notice-and-comment
process, and Chevron deference is rarely accorded to
administrative rules and interpretations that were not
subject to this process. This argwnent is of short-term
significance. It will evaporate after the regulations in
their proposed form complete the process.
The other argument has to do with whether Congress
explicitly or implicitly authorized Treasury to promulgate regulations extending section 6501(e) to overstated
basis situations. The explicit authorization argument
involves a contention I will develop at greater length in a
future article. Briefly, the statutory authority under which
the temporary regulations were promulgated allows
Treasury to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations
for the enforcement of" the code. 6 It is arguable although far from certain - that this language authorizes
only rules that implement code provisions, not rules that
extend code provisions to situations beyond the provisions' original scope. If Congress did not explicitly authorize the rules at issue, it probably did not implicitly
authorize them, either. Section 6501 is a highly detailed
and articulated statute; courts usually are disinclined to
allow other, extrinsic rules to be read into such statutes to
modify them.

I. Admin Laws Growing Importance in Tax Law
As is true of other specialties in law, there is
tendency toward insularity in tax practice.? Because 0~
the ever-growing complexity of the law, this tendency is
understandable, but ultimately nntenable. The days are
long gone when an attorney could practice the whole law
Indeed, specialization has yielded to sub-sub~
specialization. Few are the lawyers or professors who can
legitimately claim to be competent in all areas of tax Jaw
Because we are barely able to keep up with our own are~
of law, it is not surprising that we greet with little
enthusiasm the notion that we also need to learn other
areas of law (like general administrative law).
But yield we must. The tax conununity will not be able
to avoid being dragged into functional competence in
general administrative law. Both the APA8 and admin.istrative common law 9 have long made appearances in tax
cases, although they have not always been handled
wen.io

Events in recent decades have brought into greater
prominence the intersection of tax law and administrative law. One such event was the Chevron decision.

7
For articles noting this tendency, see Bryan T. Camp, "Tax
Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998," 56
Fla. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (2004); Paul L. Caron, "Tax Myopia, or Mamas
Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers," 13 Va. Tax
Rev. 517, 518 (1994); Kristin E. Hickman," A Problem of Remedy:
Responding to Treasury's (Lack of) Compliance With Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements," 76 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1153, 1155-1156 (2008); Leandra Lederman, '"Civil'izing
Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal Leaming to Statutory
Notices of Deficiency," 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 183, 183 (1996); see
also Jasper L. Cwnmings, Jr., The Supreme Court's Federal Tax
]11risprudence 3, 7, 13 (2010).
8
E.g., Wing v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 17 (1983) (rejecting
several APA-based challenges to regulations under section 612).
But see Intenno1mtain, 2010 WL 1838297, at "20 n.15 (Halpern and
Hohnes, fl., concurring) (criticizing Wing).
9 E.g., Vesco v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 101 (1979) (imposing,
without statutory basis, a duty on the IRS to behave consistently
as to similarly situated taxpayers). The IRS duty of consistency
issue is complex and has spawned many cases and much
conunentary. E.g., Steve R. Johnson, "An IRS Duty of Consistency: The Failure of Conunon Law Making and a Proposed
Statutory Solution," 77 Tenn. L. Rev. 563 (2010); Christopher M.
Pietruszkiewicz, "Does the Internal Revenue Service Have a
Duly to Treat Similarly Situated Taxpayers Similarly?" 74 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 531 (2005); Lawrence Zelenak, "Should Courts
Require the Internal Revenue Service to Be Consistent?" 38 Tax
L. Rev. 411 (1985).
10For example, the Tax Court has held the APA judicial
review provisions inapplicable because the Tax Court is not. a
govenunental "agency" for APA purposes. Nappi v. Co1111111ssioner, 58 T.C. 282, 284 (1972). The court's analysis missed the
point since the actions under challenge were those of the IRS,
not the Tax Court, and the IRS is an agency for APA purposes.
5 U.S.C. section 551(1).

5 Nat'/

Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967 (2005).
6 Section 7805(a).
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Copious case law11 and commentaries12 have examined
whether and how Chevron applies in the tax arena.13
Another event was enactment of the Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.14 Several
provisions of this landmark legislation - especially the
collection due process rules15 - have presented important admini.sb:ative law issues.16 Whether motivated by
these or other events, commentators have increasingly
focused on the interactions of tax and administrative
law.17
These interactions will continue to grow in significance. Intermountain exemplifies the trend and will contribute to it. It is to that case we now tum.

· II. Intermountaitt and Its Context
A. Background
· Section 6501(a) provides that the IRS usually must
~8sess tax liabilities within three years of the later of

·'

.When the tax return at issue was filed or was required to
b_e filed. There are, however, many exceptions to the
j.isual three-year s tatute of limitations,ts s uch as section
gsOl(e)(l), which gives the IRS six years to assess income
tax liabilities "if the taxpayer omits from gross income an
amount properly includible therein which is in excess of
2S percent of the amount of gross income stated _in the
~~tum." Section 6229(c)(2) provides a similar exception

~·.-·..uE.g., Mayo Fo11nd. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States,
568 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 2009), Doc 2009-13439, 2009 TNT
112-75, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3353 (2010); Stobie Creek Inv. LLC
United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 668 (2008), Doc 2008-16870, 2008
-~TNT 149-5; Lewis v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 48, 53-54 (2007), Doc
2007-7925, 2007 TNT 61-15.
12
E.g., Ellen P. Aprill, "Muffled Cheuron: Judicial Review of
Tax Regulations," 3 Fla. Tax. Rev. 51 (1996); Jolm F. Coverdale,
'/Chevron's Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead," 55 Admin. L. Rev. 39
(2003); .Kristin E. Hickman, "Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG," 26
Va. Tax Rev. 905 (2007) .
- -~- ~-- ~3Some in the tax community have sought to limit application of Chevron in tax cases. E.g., Mitchell M. Gans, "Deference
and the End of Tax Practice," 36 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 731
(2002).
14
',
P.L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685.
15
Sections 6320 and 6330.
~ . 16See, e.g., Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir.
2006), Doc 2006-4491, 2006 TNT 46-11, rev'g 123 T.C. 85 (2004),
Doc 2004-14878, 2004 TNT 140-17; Nick A. Zotos, "Service
Collection Abuse of Discretion: What ls the Appropriate Standard of Review and Scope of the Record in Collection Due
Process Appeals?" 62 Tax Law. 223 (2008).
17
E.g., Bryan T. Camp, "The Failure of Adversarial Process in
the Administrative State," 84 Ind. L.J. 57 (2009); Danshera Cords,
--- "Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Tax Collection
Decisions," 52 St. Lo"is U. L.f. 429 (2008);.Diane L. Fahey, "Is the
United States Tax Court Exempt From Administrative Law
JuriSprudence When Acting as a Reviewing Court?"._ Clev. St.
I:.. Rev. _ (forthcoming 2010).
18
···
See, e.g., David M. Richardson, Jerome Borison, and Steve
Johnson, Civil Tax Procedure 146-154 (2d ed. 2008).

v.

.•"'

B. The l ntermountain O p inion s
Intermountain involves what the IRS considers an
abusive tax shelter involving overstated basis. 25 Having

19
P.L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982). For discussion of the TEFRA
rules, see Richardson, Borison, and Johnson, s1tpra note 18, ch.6.
The TEFRA statute of limitations under section 6229 supplements rather than displaces the general statute of limitations
under section 6501. E.g., Curr-Spec Partners LP v. Commissioner,
579 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2009), Doc 2009-18226, 2009 TNT 154:-11,
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3321 (2010).
20
Gain from dealing in property is taxable. Section 61(a)(2).
Such gain is the excess of the amow1t realized from sale or other
disposition over the taxpayer's basis in the property. Section
lOOl (a). Thus, overstatement of basis leads to understatement of
income.
21
See Steve R. Johnson, "What's Next in the Section 6501(e)
Overstated Basis Controversy?" ABA Section of Tax'n News
Quarterly, Fall 2009, p. 19 (summarizing the cases).
22
See T.D. 9466 (Sept. 28, 2009); Doc 2009-21297, 2009 TNT
184-9.
23Temp. reg. section 301.6501(e)-IT(b). ("The rules of this
section apply to tax years with respect to.which the applicable
period for assessing tax did not expire before September 24,
2009.!') Being temporary, the new regulations expire in three
years, by September 24, 2012. Section 301.6501(e)-IT(c).· The
expectation is that the regulations, now in proposed and temporary form; will have been finalized by then.
21
See Jeremiah Coder, "IRS Strikes Back Against Judicial
Losses in Overstated Basis Cases," Tax Notes, Oct. 5, 2009, p. 19,
Doc 2009-21733, or 2009 TNT 190-4.
25
0ne sometimes gets the impression that the IRS loses
perspective when a case involves a tax shelter. The end does not
justify the means. Fundamental rules of tax administration
shoula not be violated simply because the case involves a tax
shelter. The Intermountain majority had this concern, see 2010
WL 1838297 at *5. ("We find the [Service's] interpretation to be
irreparably marred by circular, result-driven logic and the
wishful notion that the temporary regulations should apply to
this case because lntermo"ntain was involved in what [the JRS]
believes was an abusive tax transaction. For these reasons, we
refuse to accord respondent's interpretation deferential treatment.")
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for cases governed by the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act partnership audit and litigation
rules. 19
These exceptions undoubtedly apply when the taxpayer omits enough taxable receipts, but it has been
controversial whether they apply when the nnderstatement arises instead from overstated basis of sold assets.20
Case law on the section 6501(e) overstated basis issue is
divided, but both the preponderance of the cases and the
more authoritative cases are contrary to the Service's
position. 21
Following a string of high-profile defeats in section
6501(e) cases in 2009, Treasury issued the regulations in
both temporary and proposed form.22 The temporary
regulations aggressively were declared to apply to tax
years still open to assessm ent on the date of issuance,
with the intention that they apply to all pending cases,
including those the taxpayers had won but in which the
decisions had not yet become final.23 Both the new
regulations and their effective date have been highly
controversial from the start. 24

' ""

------ ·--·
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failed to assess within the normal three years, the IRS
relied on the six-year limitations period. Less than a
month before issuance of the temporary regulations, the
Tax Court decided the statute of limitations issue in
Intermounta.in's favor.26 Based on the new regulations,
the IRS filed motions to vacate and for reconsideration of
that decision.
The Tax Court denied the Service's motions, unanimous in its holding against the IRS. The 13 judges fell
into three camps, however, with 7 judges joining Judge
Robert A. Wherry Jr. in exploring the possibility that the
effective date provision as drafted did not effectuate
Treasury's intention to reach not-yet-final decisions. 27
Although advancing a questionable "plain meaning"
analysis, the majority chose not to· rest the decision on
that ground.28
Instead, the majority examined the substantive validity of the temporary regulations. Assuming arguendo that
Chevron provides the governing standard,29 the majority
concluded that the regs did not pass muster under
Chevron step one30 or Brand X. The majority concluded
that the Supreme Court's Colony decision a half century
ago31- held that what is now section 6501(e) unambiguously precludes the position taken in the temporary
regulations.32 The majority also noted, but believed it

u'T.C. Memo. 2009-195 (Sept. 1, 2009), Doc 2009-19672, 2009
TNT 168-5.
27See 2010 WL 1838297, at •4-6. One wonders how Treasury
and the IRS felt when a majority of the Tax Court said the
agencies misread their own regulations - probably much the
same way the Tax Court felt when, a few years earlier, the
Supreme Comt told the Tax Comt that it had misread its own
rules; see B11llard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (2005).
28
See 2010 WL 1838297, at •6. The majority's choice not to
resolve the case on this ground was based in part on this
consideration: "We also recognize that respondent could amend
the temporary regulations' effective/applicability date provision and file renewed motions to reconsider and to vacate based
on those amended provisions, thereby extending this dispute to
yet another case." Id. at n.13.
29Id. at •6. The majority took this tack to avoid a controversy
that has split the Tax Court before. It is ahnost universally
agreed that Chevron provides the controlling standard when
specific authority tax regulations are challenged. E.g., Carlos v.
Commissioner, 123 T.C. 275, 280 (2004). However, many Tax
Court judges have been reluctant to apply Cllevron to general
authority regulations. For example, in Swall.ows Holding, supra
note 4, the majority applied the pre-Chevron, tax-specific National Muffler case instead of C/levrorr, 126 T.C. at 131. Dissenters
would have applied Chevron; Id., at 157 (Halpern, J., dissenting)
and 175-176 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The circuit court did apply
Chevron and reversed, 515 F.3d at 170. The Intenno1mtain majority no doubt applied Chevron arguendo to avoid reopening this
wound and comting similar reversal. The Tax Comt has taken
this tack in other cases as well. E.g., Estate of Gerson v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 139, 154 (2006), Doc 2006-21771, 2006 TNT 206-15
(en bane), 11/fd, 507 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 2007).
30
Chewon U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
31
Colony Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
32
See 2010 WL 1838297, at *7-8.
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unnecessary to rule on, the taxpayer's argument tha
temporary regulations have impennissibly retro t ~e
effect.33
.
active
Four other judges concurred in an opinion penn d b i
Judge Mary Ann Cohen. This concurrence would\ Y
resolved the case on narrower grounds. Motions 8 have
. 's typ1ca
. 11
uc .as
the Serv1ce
y are granted only in unusual
cumstances,31 and an intervening statutory chan ~
such a circumst~ce.35 Th~ concurrence would have t~i:
however, that an mterverung regulatory change does '
· t o th e same 1eve I, and th us is
· msu
·
fficient
·
not
nse
to warrant
vacating or reconsidering.36
Judges James S. Halpern and Mark V. Holmes co _
curred in the result only. These judges rejected t~
majority's eff_ectiv~ date37 and Chevron analyses3a bu~
would have uwalidated the temporary regulations 0
procedural grounds. The APA applies to rulemaking b~
federal agencies, including Treasury.39 Unless a stated
exception applies, regulations are validly promulgated
only if they go through the notice-and-comment process
prescribed .by 5 U.S:C. se:tioi: 553. In general, the agency
must provide public notice m the Federal Register of its
proposed rulemaking.40 The agency must offer interested
parties the chance to submit comments and must set forth
a "concise general statement of [the regulation's] basis
and purpose."41 The regulation cannot be effective until
at least 30 days after its publication in the Code of Federal
Regulations.42
The temporary regulations were not promulgated
using this process. Nonetheless, the IRS defended the
regulations' validity on two grounds: that they fell within
the APA exception for merely interpretive rules43 and that
Congress implicitly excepted temporary tax regulations
from the notice-and-conunent requirement. 44 · The
Halpern/Holmes concurrence rejected both contentions,
and it would have held the regulations procedurally
invalid under the APA.45

33Id. at '8. Courts recently have split as to the validity of
another retroactive regulation section 1.752-6. Compnre $11111 v.
United States, 552 F. Supp.2d 1167, 1185 (D. Colo. 2008), Doc
2008-9012, 2008 TNT 80-10 (invalidating the regulation), n'V'd 011
otlter grounds, 2010 WL 4872368 (10th Cir., July 23, 2010), wit/I
Cemco Investors LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir.
2008), Doc 2008-2695, 2008 TNT 27-8 (upholding reh·oactive
apElication of the regulation).
34
See, e.g., Estate of Quick v. Co111111issio1ier, 110 T.C. 440, 441
(1998), Doc 98-21021 or 98 TNT 125-9.
35Alioto v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-199, Doc 200619533 or 2006 TNT 181-7.
36
See 2010 WL 1838297 at *9.
37
Id. at •10-11.
38Id. at •12-17.
39See 5 U.S.C. section 551(1).
40
5 U.S.C. section 553(b).
41 5 U.S.C. section 553(c).
42
5 U.S.C. section 553(d).
43
See 5 U.S.C. section 553(b)(A).
.
-wsee 2010 WL 1838297, at •17-22.
45
Important work on this issue has been done by Prof.
Kristin Hickman. See Hickman, supra note 7; and H ickrnan,
"Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury'::; (Lack _of)
Compliance With Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking
(Footnote continued 011 next page.)
TAX NOTES, August 23, 2010
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C. Evaluation of the Issues

All three opinions in lntermountain reflect distaste for
what the judges viewed as overzealous use of the regulations process. 46 Issuing a regulation while a matter is in
litigation seems like changing the rules while the game is
being played. Applying that regulation retroactively to
cases already decided smacks of changing the score after
the game is ov.er. However, taxation is not a game but a
matter of fundamental national import.47 Moreover, the
objection to the IRS "bootstrapping" itself to victory48 is
doctrinally misplaced. In both tax49 and nontaxso cases,
courts have cast suspicion on agency interpretations
apparently adopted to bootstrap the agency into victory
in litigation. But this concern is weak when applied to
otherwise valid regulations. The leading cases distinguish between bare agency litigating positions and litigating positions supported by regulations.51

i

"t

•
.

·i

J

Requirements," 82 N.D. L. Rev. 1727 (2007). The Halpern/
Hohnes concurrence frequently cited Hickman's articles. E.g.,
2010 WL 1838297 at *18, 19, 21, and 22.
O ther works exploring this issue include Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., "Treasury Violates the APA?" Tax Notes, Oct. 15, 2007,
p. 263, Doc 2007-21652, OF 2007 TNT 200-28; Naftali Z. Dembitzer, "Beyond the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998:
Perceived Abuses of the Treasury Department's Rulemaking
Authority," 52 Tax Law. 501, 503, and 509-510 (1999); Juan F.
Vasquez Jr. and Peter A. Lowy, "Challengiri.g Temporary Treasury Regulations: An Analysis of the Administrative Procedure
Act, Legislative Reenactment Doctrine, Deference, and Invalidity," 3 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 248, 249-254 (2003).
46See, e.g., 2010 WL 1838297, at •4 (majodty opinion); id. a t •9
(Cohen, J., concurring) ("Th.is petitioner should not bear the
burden of relitigating this case on a playing field unilaterally
redesigned by the adverse party after petitioner prevailed at this
level."); id. at *9 (Halpern and Holmes, JJ., concurring).
47
See Steve R. Johnson, "The Work Product Doctrine and Tax
Accrual Workpapers," Tax Notes, July 131 2009, p. 155, Doc
2009-13526, or 2009 TNT 131-9 (rejecting such analogies in
urging reversal of the panel opinion in United States v. Textron
Inc., 553 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008), rev'd, 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009),
Doc 2009-18383, 2009 TNT 155-7 (en bane), cert. denied, 78
U.S.L.W. 3375 (May 24, 2010)). The full circuit echoed this
_
rejection on reversal. 577 F.3d at 31.
48
See, e.g., Coder, supra note 24, at p. 730 (quoting attorney
and former Treasury official Christopher S. Rizek describing the
te~orary regulations as "pure bootstrap").
E.g., Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554,
562-563 (1991) (noting that the IRS had "not issued an authoritative, prelitigation interpretation") (emphasis added); Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. United States, 589 F.2d 1040, 1043 (Ct. Cl. 1978);
Swallows Holding, supra note 4, at 148.
50
E.g., Sec11rities Ind. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Syst., 468 U.S. 137, 143-144 (1984); Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d
1338, 1350 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1270 (2000). B11t see
Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007)
(deferring to an agency memorandum even though it had been
preriared in anticipation of litigation).
1Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742-743 (1996); Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988); Texaco Inc. v.
United States, 528 F.3d 703, 710-711 (9th Cir. 2008); American Bar
Association Section of Taxation, "Report of the Task Force on
Judicial Deference," 57 Tax Law. 717, 759 (2004) ("positions taken
in regulations are given full Chevron deference, even if a
regulation is promulgated in response to pending litigation").

Nonetheless, law is an intensely human operation.
One can understand distaste for the aggressive (some
would say abusive) position of Treasury and the IRS in
the temporary regulations. Certainly, the judges participating in Intermountain shared this distaste.
Although motivated by a common impulse, the Tax
Court judges differed greatly on the doctrine by which to
make that impulse legally operative. In my opinion,
Judges Halpern and Holmes had the best view of the
case. The omission of notice-and-comment is not justified
by either of the grounds asserted by the IRS. The Service's "merely interpretive" argument is hopeless, as
shown in Section ill.
The Service's argument that Congress excepted. temporary tax regulations from APA notice-and-comment is
better but probably not good enough . That argumen t
runs along the following lines: Congress revised section
7805 in 1988, adding subsection 7805(e).s2 In so doing, the
IBS argued, Congress codified Treasury's practice of
promulgating temporary regulations issu ed simultaneously with proposed regulations: "The trade-off was
that any temporary regulations promulgated in this
manner would no longer have unlimited life but instead
would expire within three years from the date of i<>suance."53
1his is a variation of the "legislative bargain" approach to statutory interpretation. That approach sees
legislation as the prodvct of compromise between competing interest groups or values and posits that the role of
the courts is to discern and give effect to the bargain
struck in the legislature.54
However, there are two problems with the Service's
argument. First, the Service's description of the "tradeoff" may be incomplete. Why do temporary regulations
exist at all? JYpically, temporary regulations are issued
when there is a _need for immediate · gilldance. Such
s ituations would fall within the APA's good-cause exception to the notice-and-comment requirements.5 5 Congress
may have fashioned the current version of section 7805 in
light of this understanding, which suggests that Congress
expected that temporary tax regulations would need to
fit into the good-caus e exception in order to avoid
notice-and-comment requirement. 56 However, there was

52

Tedutical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, P.L.
100-647, section 6232, 102 Stat. 3342.
53
IRS brief, supra note 1, at 20.
54
See, e.g., Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987);
St11pak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269, 1293 (6th Cir. 1996)
(Moore, J., concurring), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1090 (1997).
555 U.S.C. section 553(b)(B) (the r,totice-and-comment rules
do not apply "when . the agency for good cause finds (and
incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons
therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest").
56
"Congress may have intended [section 7805) to apply only
to temporary regulations that already fit into an exception to the
APA, especially considering that a need for temporary regulations would nor111ally be expected in emergency or good-cause
situations." 2010 WL 1838297, at *20 n.15 (Halpern and Holmes,
JJ., concurring).
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no emergency or other good-cause justification for the
temporary regs at issue in Intermountain - apart from the
fact that the tide of litigation had turned against the IRS.
Indeed, neither the Treasury decision accompanying the
regulations nor the Service's Intermountain briefs asserted
the good-cause exception.
Second, the Service's section 7805 contention is based
on inference, not explicit text. However, Congress has
provided that other statutes may modify APA requirements only expressly, not by implication. 57 The IRS may
have been trying obliquely to address this problem when
it argued that "section 7805(e) provides a specific statutory exemption to the general statutory requirements of
the APA," 58 supporting its theory with citations to the
canon of statutory construction that specific provisions
control over general provisions. 59 However, "specific" in
this context is not synonymous with express," and
canons "are not mandatory rules." 60 Indeed, a recent
high-profile tax case rejected use of the canon of specific
controls over general to decide the controversy there at
issue. 61
11

The arguments advanced in the other Intermountain
opinions do not strike me as persuasive. First, as pointed
out by Judges Halpern and Holmes, the regulations'
effective date provision is ambiguous, not plain. 62 The
provision might be read to mean "open under the normal
three-year period," as the Intermountain majority read it, 63
or it might mean 11open under the six-year period, as that
period is extended by this regulation, 11 as Treasury and
the IRS intended. 64 An agency1s construction of its own
ambiguous regulation is entitled to deference. 65
Second, the majority is wrong about its Chevron step
one analysis. Colony did not say that its result was
unambiguously commanded by the statute. 66 Moreover,
Colony construed section 275(c) of the code of 1939, a
predecessor of current section 650l(e), and the current

575 U.S.C. section 559; see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150,
154-155 (1999) (stressing the importance of uniformity in applying the APA). This argument is presented here in summary form
because it is not the central concern of this report. A longer
explanation would address the "legislative entrenchment"
question, i.e., the extent to which one Congress can impose
roadblocks on the amendment of a statute by a later Congress.
See, e.g., Amandeep S. Grewal, "Legislative Entrenchment Rules
in the Tax Law," 62 Admin. L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 2010).
58IRS brief, supra note 1, at 20.
59For discussion of this canon, see Steve R. Johnson, "When
General Statutes and Specific Statutes Conflict," State Tax Notes,
Jul)' 12, 2010, p. 113, Doc 2010-11554, or 2010 STT 132-3.
6
°Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001).
61
Xilinx Inc. et al. v. Commissioner, 598 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir.
2009), Doc 2009-11943, 2009 TNT 100-9.
62
See 2010 WL 1838297 at *10-11.
63
Id. at *5-6.
64
See IRS brief, supra note 1, at 5-7; CC-2010-010 (Nov. 23,
2009), Doc 2010-13821, 2010 TNT 120-20.
65
E.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Stinson v.
United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-46 (1993); Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 412-418 (1945).
66
See 357 U.S. at 33 ('1it cannot be said that the [statutory]
language is unambiguous").
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statute arguably is somewhat more congenial to the
Service's position. In the government's view:
When Congress enacted the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code, it was aware of the disagreement among the
courts that existed at the time regarding the proper
scope of section 275. The changes that Congress
enacted [in 1954] predated ... Colony and were
intended to resolve the matter for the future. Therefore, by amending the Internal Revenue Code,
including the addition of a special definition of
"gross income" with respect to a trade or business,
Congress effectively limited what ultimately became the holding in Colony, to cases subject to
section 275(c).67
Finally, the pre-Intermountain case law refutes Intermountain's expansive reading of Colony. The IRS won
some of the cases on the overstated basis issue decided
after Colony. 68 Further, even cases the IRS lost stopped
short of saying that Colony had found the statute unambiguous. Bakersfield conceded that the Service's interpretation was reasonable (although ultimately erroneous)69
and stated that the IRS "may have the authority to
promulgate a reasonable reinterpretation of an ambiguous provision of the tax code, even if its interpretation
runs contrary to the Supreme Court's 'opinion as to the
best reading' of that provision." 70 Salman Ranch involved
a 2-2 split of the judges, but the IRS lost because the two
judges agreeing with it were a trial judge and an appellate judge while the two judges agreeing with the taxpayer were both appellate judges.n
There are two possibilities. Either the judges in these
prior cases failed to notice that Colony had settled the
issue, or more likely, the Intermountain majority overplayed its hand in characterizing Colony's holding.
Third, the narrow ground offered by Judge Cohen and
the judges joining her is dubious. Yes, a statute outranks
a regulation. But, as developed below in Section III.A.l, a
validly promulgated legislative regulation has the force
of law. 72 Thus, the distinction offered by Judge Cohen's
concurrence is not a meaningful difference.

67T.D. 9466, supra note 22, at 552; see also CC&F Western
Operations Ltd. P'ship, 273 F.3d 402, 406 n.2 (1st Cir. 2001), Doc
2001-30601, 2001 TNT 239-11. ("Whether Colony's main holding
carries over to section 6501(e) is at least doubtful.")
68
Burks v. United States, 2009 WL 2600358 (N.D. Tex. June 13,
2009); Home Concrete & Supply LLC v. United States, 599 F.
Supp.2d 678 (E.D.N.C. 2008); Brandon Ridge Partners v. United
States, 2007-2 U.S. Tax Cas. para. 50,573 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
69
Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767, 775
(9th Cir. 2009), Doc 2009-13801, 2009 TNT 115-10.
70
Id. at 778 (citing Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-983).
71
Salmun Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2009), Doc 2009-17311, 2009 TNT 145-13 (2-1 decision), rev'g 79
Fed. Cl. 189 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2007), Doc 2007-25341, 2007 TNT 221-12.
72
E.g., Justice Department, Attorney General's Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act 30 at n.3 (1947); Robert A. Anthony,
11
A Taxonomy of Federal Agency Rules," 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1045,
1046 (2000); Peter L. Strauss, "The Rulemaking Continuum," 41
Duke L.J. 1463, 1464 (1992). The Attorney General's Manual is "the
Government's own most authoritative interpretation of the
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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III. Legislative Versus In terpretive Tax Regulations
The APA notice-and-conunent rules are important.
They are "the procedure by which the persons affected by
legislative rules are enabled to communicate their concerns in a comprehensive and systematic fashion to
legislating agency." 73 This allows participation by the
governed and decreases the chance of error by the
agency. 74
There are exceptions to the APA's command that
regulations go through notice-and-comrnent. One exception arguably relevant here operates when the regulation
is interpretive, not legislative, in nature.75 In attempting
to deflect Intermountain's APA argument, the IRS relied
in part on this exception.76 Indeed, this is a position that
Treasury and the IRS often take as to tax regulations.77
The government's position is defective. The IRS is
trying to have its cake and eat it, too, by claiming that (1)
the regulations did not have to go through notice-andcomment because they are interpretive, not legislative,
yet (2) the regulations have the force of law even thou gh
they are not legislative. The IRS is wrong on both ends:
The regulations at issue are legislative (thus had to go
through notice-and-conunent) and lack force of law (and
thus do not reverse the case law adverse to the IRS) if
they are merely interpref'.!-ve. .

A. Legislative, Not Interpretive
The key difference between legislative and interpretiv:e regulations is that the former mak~ binding law
while the latter do not. The IRS wants the temporary
regulations at issue to make law binding the courts and
compelling them to reverse the former thrust of the
section 6501(e) case law. These points are developed
below, after which I consider and reject the Service's two
arguments for treating the regulations as merely interpretive:·that they are general, not specific authority, and that
they were derived by statutory interpretation. ·
1. 'Force of law' nature of legislative regulations. Courts
have had difficulty drawing lines to distinguish legislative regulations from interpretive ones.78 The core of

APA . . . which [the Supreme CoUit has] repeatedly given great
weight." Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
73
Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 171 (7th Cir. 1986).
74
See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, "Models of Administrative Action," 72 Va. L. Rev. 363, 364 (1986) (stating that the APA's
rulemaking approach "loosely resembles the legislative process"); Mark Seidenfeld, "A Civic Republican Justification for the
Bureaucratic State," 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1560 (1992) (maintaining that the notice-and-comment process "is specifically
geared to advance the requirements of civic republican theory"
though perhaps "only to a limited extent," given the procedures
·
agencies actually use).
75
5 U.S.C. section 553(b).
76
See IRS brief, supra note 1, at 21-23.
77
. '
The IRS takes the position that most Treasury regulations
are interpretive in nature. Internal Revenue Manual section
32.1.5.4.7.5.1; see also Hickman, supra note 45, at 1760-1773.
78
.
See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce Jr., "Distinguishing Legislative
Rules From Interpretative Rules," 52 Admin. L. Rev. 547, 547
(2000) ("For over fifty years, courts and commentators have
<Footnote continued in next column.)

distinction is reasonably clear, however, and suffices to
resolve the Intermountain issue. Legislative regulations
have the force of law - that is, they make binding law or
change the law. Interpretive regulations do not have force
of law; they merely inform the public of what the agency
believes the statute means.79
Because it hears the largest number of cases involving
federal agencies, the D.C. Circuit is sometimes called the
second most important federal court.so The D.C. Circuit's
decision in American Mining Congresss1 is among the most
influential on the legislative/interpretive distinction.s2
The decision offered the following hallmarks of legislative rule status:
(1) whether in the absence of the rule there would
not be an adequate legislative basis for enforcement
action or other agency action to confer benefits or
ensure the performance of duties, (2) whether the
agency has published the rule in the Code of
Federal Regulations, (3) whether the agency has
explicitly invoked its general legislative authority,
or (4) whether the rule effectively amends a prior
legislative rule.s3

Significantly, the decision added: "If the answer to any
of these questions is affirmative, we have a legislative,
not an interpretive rule. "B4
Under this test, the temporary regs at issue in Intermountain are legislative, not interpretive.as Not just one,

struggled to identify, and to apply, criteria that are appropriate
to distinguish between legislative and interpretative rules. The
results have not been pretty.") (citing cases).
For additional discussion of the "legislative versus interpretive" issue, see Robert A. Anthony, "Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and Courts?" 7 Yale/. Reg. 1 (1990);
Anthony, "'Interpretive' Rules, 'Legislative' Rules and 'Spurious' Rules: Lifting the Smog," 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 1 (1994);
Anthony, "Three Settings iri Which Nonlegislative Rules Should
Not Bind," 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1313 (2001); and William Funk,
"When Is a 'Rule' a Regulation? Marking a Clear Line Between
Nonlegislative Rules and Legislative Rules," 54 Admin. L. Rev.
659 (2002).
.
79 E.g., Clrn;sler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-302 (1979).
80 "In administrative law comers, some say that D.C. Circuit
cases carry equal - if not more - precedential weight than
Supreme Court decisions." Jim Rossi, "Does the Solicitor General Advantage Thwart the Rule of Law in the Administrative
State?" 28 Fl. St. U.L. Rev. 459, 460 (2000).
81
American Mining Congress v. Mine Safeti; & Health Admin.,
995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
82
See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 45, at 1766 (calling American
Mining Congress the "dominant standard"); Pierce, supra note 78,
at 548 (stating that American Mining Congress "does an excellent
job of identifying all of the [important) criteria"); Richard J.
Pierce Jr., Administrative Law Treatise 454 (5th ed. 2010) (noting
that Americnn Mining Congress has been adopted in six circuits,
including the Tenth Circuit, to which I11ten11ountain is appealabl~.
,
·
American Mining Congress, 995 F.2d at 1112. Subsequent
cases have modified. these indicia at the margins. See 2010 WL
1838297, at •19 (Halpern and Holmes, JJ., concurring).
~95 F.2d at 1112 (emphasis added).
·
85Sig:nificantly, temporary tax regulations have the same
weight as final regulations. E.g., U11ionBanCal v. Commissioner,
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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but two of the indicia are present. The first indicium is
present because, absent the regulations, the IRS would
have no adequate legal basis for applying section 6501(e)
to overstated basis situations. Treasury and the IRS were
not simply informing the public of their view of the
statute - that view was already well known from the
many cases (most of them losses86) in which the government had advanced it. The whole point of issuing the
regulations was to change the law and bind the courts by
administratively reversing the law as articulated by the
weight of the cases.87
The third indicium also is present. In paragraph 1 of
the amendment to 26 C.F.R. part 301 introduced by the
new regulations, Treasury explicitly invoked its general
legislative authority under section 7805.88 Section 7805(a)
is a general conferral of authority, and "the gen eral
consensus now is that a general rulemaking power
confers delegated power [on agencies] to adopt binding
legislative rules."89
The regulations at issue in Intermountain seek to make
or change binding law, not merely to inform the public of
Treasury's construction of the statute. Therefore, they are
legislative in nature and so do not qualify for the
interpretive regulations exception to the APA notice-andcomrnent requirements. We now tum to the Service's
rejoinders to thaf argument.
2. General authority versus specific authority. The Service's first rejoinder in Intermountain 9o relies on an error
that Treasury and the IRS have perpetuated for decades
and that taxpayers and even courts have too often
accepted.91 This error equates interpretive regulations
with regulations issued under the general authority of
section 7805(a) and equates legislative regulations with
regulations issued under specific authority within the
code section at issue. Because the temporary regs were
issued under section 7805(a) and not under sections 6501
or 6229, the IRS claims they are interpretive.
The problem is that the equations on which the
Service's argument rests are wrong, and the mere fact

305 F.3d 976, 985 (9th Cir. 2002), Doc 2002-21272, 2002 TNT
182-11; E. Nonnan Peterson Marital Trust v. Commissioner, 78 F.3d
795, 798 (2d Cir. 1996).
86 E.g., Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed
Cir. 2009); Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d
767 ~9th Cir. 2009).
8
As the Halpern/Holmes concurrence notes, the IRS "wants
us to vacate our otherwise final decision, which he could not
logically ask us to do without implying that the [Treasury]
intended that these new rules have the force of law." 2010 WL
1838297 at *20; cf United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005)
(Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part) ("Because [the sentencing guidelines] are binding on judges, we
have consistently held that the Guidelines have the force and
effect of laws.").
882009-43 IRB at 552.
89 Michael Asimow, "Public Participation in the Adoption of .
Temporary Tax Regulations," 44 Tax Law. 343, 354 (1991) (citing
"emf.hatic holdings" in several nontax cases).
9 See 2010 WL 1838297 at *18-20.
.
91
See John F. Coverdale,. "Court Review of Tax Regulations
and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era," 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
35, 52 (1995).

that much of the tax community has long recited these
equations without question does not make them right 92
The classification of a regulation as legislative or int~r
pretive depends on whether the regulation has the force
of law, not on which code section the regulation was
promulgated under. Tax regulations that make bindin
law are legislative whether they are promulgated unde~
specific authority or general authority.93
Nevertheless, the IRS argued in Intermountain as follows:
Regulations that are not interpretive but rather
legislative or substantive generally result from statutes that specifically direct the [Treasury] to prescribe regulations under a provision of the
law. .. . In these situations, Congress simply provides an end result without any guidance as to how
to achieve the end result. Regulations issued pursuant to this type of blank slate grant of authority
are issued to create substantive law necessary to
achieve the end result commanded by Congress,
thus they are legislative or substantive regulations.
In contrast, the statutory provisions in this case,
sections 6229 and 6501, do not direct the Secretary
to issue regulations... . There is no mandate from
Congress requiring the [Treasury] to take any action
other than administer the provisions.94
In my opinion that argument is "".eak. First, the "blank
slate" description of specific-authority regulations is
overinclusive. As shown below, the statutes authorizing
su ch regulations often impose specific limits within
which Treasury is to exercise the delegated power.95

Second, the "no mandate" description is underinclusive and is not limited to general authority regulations.
Treasury sometimes does not issue regulations even
when au thorized to do so by sp ecific authority provisions,96 which w1dercuts.the practical significance of any
"mandate." Moreover, Chevron and other cases have
mad e it clear that Congress confers power, not just by
express delegations, but also imp licitly by leaving gaps
for the agency to fill.97 The agency can make binding
rules in either case. An implicit delegation by means of

oncarr v. United States, 560 U.S. __, 2010 WL 2160783, at *13
(June 1, 2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("A bad argwnent does not
im~rove with repetition.").
3 See, e.g., Shala/a v. Guernsei; Mem. Hosp., 514 U.S. 'i57, 99
(1995); American Hosp. Ass'11 v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 655-656 (7th
Cir. 1990); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d
688, 695 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); Natio11nl
Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
94IRS brief, supra note 1, at 22.
95
See subpart V.B.2.
.
96For example, the sorry saga of Treasury's failure to issue
debt versus equity regulations under section 385 is well known.
See, e.g., Glenn E. Coven, Robert J. Peroni, and Richard Cr~w
ford Pugh, Cases and Materials on Taxation of Business Enterprrses
132 ~2d ed. 2002).
9:
9 E.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 19 '
231 (1974).
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leaving a gap to be filled is, if anything, even more of a
no mandate" situation than a general authority delegation.
Third, and most importantly, even if the "blank slate"
versus "no mandate" categories had been accurately
described by the IRS, it is not clear why the distinction
would matter. Why does the fact that Treasury could
have chosen not to issue a particular regulation mean
that when it does issue a regulation it may skip noticeand-comment? The APA prescribes notice-and-comment
both to allow the governed to express their views and to
reduce the chance of the agency making a policy error.
Those reasons apply as fully when an agency issues a
regulation Congress didn't require as when it issues a
regulation Congress did require.
3. Process of interpretation. In Hoctor, a nontax case, the
Seventh Circuit took a different tack to defining interpretive regulations. In the opinion for the court, Chief Judge
Richard A. Posner wrote that a regulation is interpretive
11
only if it can be derived from the [statute or other
governing law] by a process reasonably described as ·
interpretation ."98
In the cases litigated before issuance of the temporary
regulations, the IRS advanced plausible (though usually
unavailing) statutory interpretation arguments for its
view that basis overstatements are within the ambit of
the six-year limitations period.99 Thus, the government
could argue that the regulations are derived from sections 6501 and 6229 "by a process reasonably described
as interpretalion."100
There are three problems with this argument. First, it
is not clear that Hoctor was providing a universal or even
general test. Even if it was, Hoctor has not been widely
followed. Certainly, American Mining has been far more
influential.
,. ·second, Hoctor is in tension with the established
. . distinction between legislative and interpretive regula-·.. tiOns. One can imagine situations in which a regulation
c.ould be derived via a process of interpretation (so would
be ·interpretive under Hoctor) but would make binding
law (so would be legislative under the established definition). A regulation cannot be both legislative and
interpretive, making Hoctor at odds with the dominant
standard.101
11

I

I

=:•

I
Ii(

98
•
Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 170.
99
,.
See, e.g., Salman Ranch, 573

F.3d at 1371-1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(describing the Service's statutory arguments).
·~•.: 100Although only in passing and without citation to Hoctor,
the IRS invoked this argument in Inten11011ntain. IRS brief, supra
note 1, at 23. ("Under any applicable legal test or measure, the
temporary regulations are interpretive because they merely
. interpret an ambiguous phrase in the relevant statutes and are
· thus exempt from the APA's notice and comment requirements.")
101

·

The root of the problem is that the Hoctor approach applies
an ordinary, vemacuJar meaning to "interpretation" and its
·deJ:ivative terms. But "interpretive" as used in the "interpretive
versus legislative" dichotomy is a term of art. See generally Yule
~, Stat11tory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends,
~. (Cong. Res. Serv. No. 97-589) (rev. Aug. 31, 2008) (distin.guishing between terms of art and wor_ds of ordinary meaning).

. .;,;

i

Third, the argument that the regs at issue were derived
by a process of interpretation might work better on a
clean slate than in the current posture. It would have
been easier to say that the temporary regs were derived
via interpretation before the majority of the cases (and the
most authoritative of the cases) rejected the interpretations on which the position is based.
In short, I believe the new regulations are legislative in
character. They do not qualify for the interpretive rule
exception to the APA notice-and-comment requirements.

B. Nonbinding if Only In terpretive
Back to the basics. Legislative regulations make binding law; interpretive regulations do not. Thus, if contrary to the points in Section ID.A above - the IBS
were to prevail in its argument that the temporary
regulations are merely interpretive, the IRS would have
won the battle but lost the war. The interpretive temporary regulations woulcj. not be binding on the courts.102
Being just the opinion of the IRS, they would be entitled
to a respectful hearing, which wouldn't count for much.
The courts have already heard the Service's position and
have rejected it, for the most part.
·
The IRS, however, maintains that "interpretative rules
can be implemented by interpretative Treasury regulations that are decreed to have force of law but that still
qualify as interpretative rules exempt from the APA,"103
citing National Restaurant. 104
This can't be right for three reasons. First, the argument igriores th.e fundamental trade-off embodied ii) the
APA notice-and-comment requirements. ''Legislative
rules carry the force and effect of law, which is why the
APA ordinarily subjects these rules to public notice and
comment before they become final." 105 Precisely because
they are not binding, the harm posed by a misguided
interpretive regulation is far less than the harm that
would be posed by a misguided legislative regulation,
which is why it is safe to exempt interpretive, but not
legislative, rules from notice-and-comment. The Service's
position would imbalanc~ th.e congressional calculation
by making a rule binding while dispensing with the
safeguard that makes binding administrative power an
acceptable risk.106

102
See, e.g., William Ftmk, "A Primer on Nonlegislative
RuJes," 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1321, 1332-1333 (2001).
l03JRS brief, supra note 1, at 21.
104
National Restaurant Ass'n v. Simon, 411 F. Supp. 993, 999
(D.D.C. 1976).
105Kristin E. Hickman, "IRB Guidance: The No Man's Land
of Tax Code Interpretation," 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 239, 253-254.
10611So long as the administrative state remains such a
pervasive and coercive force in society, one shouJd think very
hard before eliminating legal doctrines that provide checks on
the arbitrariness of agency action... . [We) must not divert the
focus entirely away from the need·to ensure that agencies act
not only within acceptable legal and political bounds, but aJso
exercise their discretion in a deliberative manner." Mark Seidenfeld, "Demystifying Deossification: · Rethinking Recent ProposaJs to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment
RuJemaking," 75 Tex. L. Rev. 483, 489-490 (1997).

1
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Second, in trying to have it both ways, the IRS would
put interpretive regulations in a preferred position relative to legislative regulations. From the agency's standpoint, interpretive regulations would have the same
benefit (binding effect) as legislative regulations but
without the same inconvenience (having to go through
notice-and-comment). As a practical matter, legislative
regulations could become redundancies, the legislative
category being swallowed by the interpretive category. It
is hard to believe Congress intended such an outcome.
Third, National Restaurant is weak authority. It is an
old trial court decision that is incompletely reasoned,
little cited, and difficult to reconcile with current doctrine. National Restaurant acknowledged that controlling
circuit law distinguished between legislative and interpretive rules based on the binding nature of the former
and the nonbinding nature of the latter.107 The court still
rejected a "no notice-and-comment" challenge to a revenue ruling that created new record-keeping and reporting requirements because the revenue ruling did so " by
interpreting the meaning of already binding regulations,
rather than by creating any new obligations."1os To justify
the holding, the court said that in its view, "it _is a ruling
of the sort that Congress intended the [IRS] to make as a
matter of administrative construction, not subject to the
normal rulemaking requiremerlts."109 This is clairvoyance, not reasoning.

IV. Inten1101mtain and Brai1d X
The temporary regulations are an attempt by an
agency to reverse judicial statutory interpretation. Can
agencies do that? 110 Brand X is a key case. The Supreme
Court held that a regulation trumps prior judicial interpretations as long as two conditions are met: the regulation qualifies for Chevron deference, and the prior cases
did not say their results were commanded by an unambiguous statute.111
·
The Intermoimtain majority concluded that . section
6501(e) unambiguously precludes the Service's position
(thus defeating Chevron deference) and that the Supreme
Court had so held in Colony. As noted in Section Il.C, I
disagree with these conclusions. It will be interesting to
see whether future decisions embrace or reject them.
Brand X is a comparativeli recent decision, and important questions it raises still must be resolved.112 Inter-

107411 F. Supp. at 999.
108Jd.
109Jd.
11°For discussion of this issue in the context of the check-thebox regulations as to entity classification, see Gregg Polsky,
"Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?" 84 B.U. L. Rev. 185
(2004). The courts, however, have upheld the check-the-box
regulations. E.g., Littriel/o v. United Stales, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir.
2007), Doc 2007-9567, 2007 TNT 73-16.
111
545 U.S. at 982.
11
2Hundreds of cases have cited Brand X, and a substantial
literature exists as to it. E.g., Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d
1102, 1113-1115 (9th CiL 2009); Doug Geyser, Note, "Courts Still
'Say What the Law ls': Explaining the Ftmctions of the Judiciary
and Agencies After Brand X," 106 Col11m. L. R~. 2129 (2006).
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mountain and comparable cases may help on some of
these questions but not on others. Three such questions
are addressed below.

A. What Intennountain-Type Cases M ay Clarify
The first question is the "magic words" issue. The
second prong of the Brand X test requires that the holding
in a prior case was not based on an unambiguous statute.
Is the second prong satisfied only if the prior case
expressly used "unambiguous" or a synonym in characterizing the statute? Courts have grappled with similar
issues in other areas of administrative law. For example,
the APA distinguishes between informal and formal
agency rulemaking (and agency adjudication). When a
regulation may be promulgated informally, the noticeand-comment process suffices. When formal rulemaking
is required, additional procedw·al steps must be taken.113
Formal rulemaking is requiJ:ed when the underlying
statute states that the rules in question "are required . .. to be made on the record after opportunity for
an agency hearing.'' 114 Must precisely or essentially these
words appear in the statute, or may a court hold that
formal rulemaking is triggered by some less exact statutory language? The case law is not wholly consistent.11s
The Supreme Court seems to have embraced the former
alternative, the magic words approach.116
But context is everything in law, 117 and the magic
words question need not be handled the same way for
Brand X purposes as for informal versus formal rulemaking purposes. 118 Intermountain rejected the contention
that the word "unambiguous" need appear in the prior
cases that a regulation is trying to reverse.n9 I think it
was right to do so.

Colony and some other precedents were decided before Brand X and even Chevron were handed down.
Unless they are charged with a burden of precognition,
the justices and judges deciding those cases had no
reason to know that their omitting particular words from
their opinions could · affect the allocation of power between courts and agencies.
·

113See

5 U.S.C. sections 556 and 557.
5 U.S.C. section 553(c).
115See Alfred C. Aman Jr., Administrative Law and Process, sec.
3.03 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing both formal agency adjudication
and formal agency rulemaking).
116
E.g., United States v. Florida East Const I<ailway, 410 U.S. 224,
241-242 (1973).
117
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal
Courts and the Law, 37 (1997).
118
For instance, the courts freely dispense with the "consistent meaning" canon of statutory construction when the same
word appears in substantively different statutory contexts. See
Steve R. Johru;on, "Supertext and Consistent Meaning," State
Tax Notes, May 25, 2009, p. 675, Doc 2009-9545, or 2009 STf 99-4.
rnlsee 2010 WL 1838297, at "8 n.22 ("We agree . . . with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which stated that
we ... do not hold that a court must say in so many magic
words that its holding is the only permissible interpretation of
the statute in order for that holding to be binding on an
agency."') (quoting Fernandez v. Keisler, 502 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir.
2007)).
114
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Thus, the test under Brand X should be whether the
prior cases, fairly read, suggest a view that the statute is
unambiguous, not that the word "unambiguous" actually appear in the prior cases. If that construction prevails, Intermountain will have contributed to clarifying

Brand

x.120

Unfortunately, the Intermountain majority misapplied
this approach. The majority read Colony to hold the
statute to be unambiguous based on the legislative history, citing parts of the opinion calling the history "persuasive evidence" and saying that it "show.s to [the
majority's] satisfaction" that Congress intended the result
reached.121 This quoted language surely reflects a comfort
l,evel exceeding 50 percent, but it strikes me as falling
short of unam biguous.
. Colony can be compared with the prior judicial interpretation at issue in Brand X. In Brand X the Ninth Circuit
held against the Federal Communications Commission
because the agency's position was incompatible with the
prior judicial interpretation of the governing statute in
AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland. 122 The Supreme Court
reversed the Nirlth Circuit irl. Brand X, findirlg that the
Portland court had not treated the underlying statute as
unambiguous but had "held only that [its readirlg was]
the best reading of" the statute. 123 Similarly, the Colony
opinion seems to me to reach only a "best readirlg"
~onclusion, not an "unambiguous" conclusion.

'

Ir

B. What Intennountain-Type Cases May Not Clarify
One unsettled question from Brand Xis what should
be done if the conclusions reached by the prior case on
whether the statute is ambiguous are insupportable.
What if the p recedent declared the statute to be unambiguous, but better analysis would have called it ambiguous, and vice versa?
''. I don't think Jntermountain presents either of these
situations. In my view, the predecessor of sectio~ 6501(e)
~--I
·-.~""'.'--~-"Vas ambiguous on whether basis overstatements are
r
:·,!·
covered, and current section 6501(e)· remains so; and
£Ontrary to Intermountain, Colony cannot be read as declat ing the statute to unambiguously exclude basis overstatements.
:, But what if I am right about the first of these conclu. .. . ~ions and wrong about the second? In other words, what
.;:.i j£ Colony ei;roneously treated an ambiguous statute as
" · unambiguous? In that case, future courts would either
have to reject Brand X protection for the new regulations
even though the Colony Court was wrong about arnbigu. i,ty, or protect the regulations under Brand X on the
ground that Colony's conclusion was wrong. The choice
courts make between these alternatives would clarify the
in1plementation of the Brand X rule.
t~.:

.\-\

~.

r. ·· 1zosee generally Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman,
-!!.Chevron's Domain,". 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 917 (2001); Note, "Implementing Brand X: What CoWlts as a Step One Holding?" 119
·Harv. L. Rev. 1532 (2006) (both exploring alternative approaches
· t'o this issue).
.
121
"·
357 U.S. at 33 and 36.
122
. 1·
216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
123
· '-• . 545 U.S. at 984 (emphasis in original).
..

:

.

However, Intermountain-type cases are not a good
vehicle for achievirlg that clarification. Colony was a
Supreme Court decision, and lower courts are not authorized to declare Supreme Court decisions wrongly reasoned.124 Thus, this clarification would be achieved only
if the Supreme Court itself heard and decided Intermountain or a future case in this line. Given the number of tax
cases the Supreme Court takes each year, 125 and the other
important tax issues that vie for the Court's attention, this
scenario is unlikely.126

I also doubt that Intermountain-type cases, or indeed
cases of any type, will lead to resolution of another of
Brand X's ambiguities: whether the clarity of the statute is
to be determirled only from the statutory text or whether
legislative history also may be examined as part of the
inquiry. The Intermountain majority believed that resort to
legislative history is properly part of the process,127 while
Judges Halpern and Holmes believed text to be controlling, saying that "Colony's resort to legislative history in
the first place shows a gap that [Treasury] is ipso facto .
allowed to fill." 128
The Halpern/Holmes concurrence said that this ambiguity in Brand X is "not [an issue] that we as a trial
court can possibly solve on our own."129 I would go
further and offer that thic; Brand X issue will never be
resolved by ·any court because the dispute ultimately
reflects the dash between textualism
purposivism in
statutory interpretation. Despite centuries of debate, that
clash .nas not been resolved and likely never will be
resolved.130

and

The main support for the p osition that the Brand X
ambiguity analysis irlcludes legislative history is Chevron,
which states that step one is answered by resort to
"traditional tools of statutory construction,"131 which for
many judges would include legislative history. Chevron
was written by Justice John Paul Stevens, a leading
purposivist, but the Brand X opinion was written by
Justice Clarence Thomas, a textualist (or even literalist).
Justice Thomas framed the Brand X inquiry as whether
"the prior court decision holds that its construction
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute,"13 2 a

124E.g., Agostini v. Felton, S21 U.S. 203, '2537 (1997) (requiring
lower cowts to adhere to the Court's directly controlling
precedents, even those resting on rationales rejected in other
decisions).
125Usually between one and four.
126
For example, the Court recently denied certiorari on the
important issue of the amenability of tax accrual workpapers to
the federal tax liens. United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1st
Cir. 2009) (en bane), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010). This is a
reminder that importance alone does not guarantee obtaining
the Supreme Court's attention.
127
2010 WL 1838297, at *7.
128/d. at *15.
t2?Id.

130For discussion of these approaches to statutory interpretation, see Frank B. Cross, The Throry and Practice of Statutory
Intei:fi'etation, chs. 2 and 3 (2009).
1 1467 U.S. at 843.
132545 U.S. at 982 (emphasis added).
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locution that s eems to limit the inquiry to the statutory
language133 (and perhaps statutory structure and maybe
some canons134).
Future Brand X decisions will sometimes be written by
purposivist judges who will embrace legislative history,
and sometimes by textualist judges who will eschew it.
With each new decision, one side or the other will gain
ascendancy, but only until the next opinion penned by a
jurist of the contrary persuasion on statutory interpretation. Intermountain-type cases won't resolve the legislative history issue, which I don't believe will ever be
resolved.
The history of Chevron supports this pessimistic prediction. Chevron is over 25 years old and remains unclear
in key respects. Consider four points in this regard,
moving from general to specific.
First, the courts - particularly the Supreme Court have seriously muddied the thres hold question of when
Chevron applies. By one count, the Supreme Court has
applied no fewer than seven distinct deference regimes in
the years after Chevron - often without explanation of
why one regime was used instead of another135 leaving lower courts with inadequate guidance,136 and
the Supreme Court's deference jurisprudence a mess.137
Second, when Chevron is held to provide the govern~
ing s tandard, there is confusion about how its steps a re to
be applied. Intermountain, using Chevron s tep orie, held
that the statute unambiguously forecloses the regulation
(or at least that Colony's view of tJ:t.e statute does). But it
has long been thought that cow-ts manipulate the step
one analysis to reach the desired results o r, more genero usly, that step one holdings have a "length of the
Chancellor's foot" quality.100 "The threshold determination of ambiguity remains the most troubling aspect of
the Court's deference jurisprudence."139

133

See, e.g., AARP v. EEOC, 390 F. Supp.2d 437, 445 (E.D. Pa.
2005) (stating that terms in Bmnd X "clarified the Chevron
standard itself"), affd on other gro11nds, 489 F.3d 558 (3d Cir.
2007).
134
Brand X itself referred to a substantive canon: the rule of
leni7s. 545 U.S. at 985.
1 5 William N. Eskridge and Lawrence E. Bauer, "The Continuwn of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency
Statutory Interpretation From Chevron to Hamdan," 96 Geo. LJ.
1083, 1098-1117 (2008).
136
See, e.g., Wilderness Society v. United States Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 316 F.3d 913, 921 (9th Cir. 2003); Adrian Vermeule, "Mead
in the Trenches," 71 Geo. Wasli. L. Rev. 347, 361 (2003) ("the Court
has inadvertently sent the lower courts stumbling into a noman's land").
137Eskridge and Bauer, supra note 135, at 1157; see also Lisa
Schultz Bressman, "How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of
Agency Action," 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443, 1464 (2005); Jim Rossi,
"Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within U1e
Architecture of Chevron," 42 Wm. & Man; L. Rev. 1105, 1125
(2001) (noting "much W'\certainty regarding how Skidmore
should be applied to agency interpretations of law" as a result
of ~ost-Chevron case law).
·
38 See, e.g., Note, '"How Clear Is Clear' in Chevron's Step
One?" 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1687, 1691-1692 (2005).
139
J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, "Tailoring Deference to Variety
With a Wink and a Nod to Chevron: The. Roberts Court and the
(Footnote continued in next column.)
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Third, in post-Chevron cases the Supreme Court has
been inconsistent on what the role of the "traditional
tools of statutory construction" is in the step one analysis.
In some cases, it has applied at least some of these tools
at step one,140 w hile in other cases, it has not done so even
though presented w ith the opportunity.141
Fourth, if traditional tools should be applied, there is
little consistency as to w hat those tools are. This may
result from the difficulties of coalition building,142 sloppiness, or results orientation.143 Whatever the cause, the
inconsistency is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.t44
The interpretative tool stressed by the Intermountain
majority is legislative history. Supreme Court cases support at least three inconsistent positions on legislative
history: (1) the history is to be considered at step onel4S;
(2) it is not to be considered at s tep.one146; and (3) it is to
be considered at step one but only if the statutory text is
ambiguous.147 As the Halpern/Holmes concurrence
shows,148 lower court decisions also are split.149

, . ~·

~

i
J
1·

~

The post-Chevron case law is a mess, largely because of
the Su p reme Court's own vacillation and divisions on the
case's purport. The passage of time has confused the
situation more, with some declaring Chevron dead15-0 and

Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Law," 36 J. Legis. 18, 89 (2010).
140£.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 583 (2000).
141E.g., Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1172 (2009) (Stevens,
J., conclll'ring in part and dissenting in part); Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452, 462-463 (1997).
142
See Frank H. Easterbrook, "Ways of Criticizing the Court,"
95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 815-817 (1982).
143See Goering, supra note 139, at 90. ("More often than not,
a shifting majority of the Roberts Court appears to cherry-pick
among [traditional tools of statutory construction] to reach its
desired result.")
1
""The issue has been part of the universe of Chevron
discussion for many years. See, e.g., Mark Seidenield, "A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes," 73 Tex. L. Rev.
83, 85 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, "Law and Administration After
Chevron," 90 Co/um. L. Rev. 2071, 2105-2119 (1990).
145E.g., FDA v. Brawn & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120,
133, 137 (2000).
146E.g., Nat'/ R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bostim & Me. Corp., 503
U.S. 407, 417 (1992); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 293
n.4 (1988).
147
.
E.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. DOE, 550 U.S. 81, 89
(2007); HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 132-133 (2002).
148
See 2010 WL 1838297, at 14-15 (providing a circuit-bycircuit breakdown of cases on the issue).
149
Compare Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (use
of legislative history "is permissible and may even be required
at stage one of Chevron") with United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288,
292 (3d Cir. 2008) (agreeing with the government's argument
that "legislative history should not be considered at 01evro11
step one"), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 937 (2009); see also Melina Forte,
Case Comment, "May Legislative H.istory Be Considered at
Chevron Step One? The Third Circuit Dances the Chevron TwoSte~ in United States v. Geiser," 54 Vill. L. Rev. 727 (2009).
50Ann Graham, "Searching for Chevron in Muddy Watters:
The Roberts Court and Judicial Review of Agency Regulations,"
60 Admin. L. Rev. 229, 239 (2008). ("Classical Chevron analysis is
dead.") Graham does not mourn that perceived demise because
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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others urging that it be relegated to the doctrinal dustbin.151 I expect no better of Brand X, at least regarding this
issue. Against this larger context, future Intermountaintype cases - no matter the holdings - are unlikely to
have lasting effect.
! 1i- '

-··,' ... "·~· -

V. Roads Not Traveled

...J:'here may be ways to attack the regulations beyond
fuo~e developed in the Intermountain opinions. Some
pos~ibilities are explored below. I am not endorsing these
~{gu.ments, instead offering them to provoke discussion
and thought.152
; i'he arguments proceed from a common foundation.
1
S.1,ibseguent cases have shown that Chevron does not
provide .the analytical framework for all cases in which
agency rules are challenged. Instead, Chevron will apply
only if both of two conditions are present: (1) Congress
has delegated (either expressly or implicitly) rulemaking
authority to the agency, and (2) the agency issued the
challenged position in the exercise of that authority.153
One's initial reaction might be similar to that of the IRS,
which I paraphrase here: "Of course the conditions are
satisfied here. In section 7805(a), Congre~s delegated to
'Jreasury general rulemaking authority as to the entire
~ode, and Treasury stated that the 2009 regulations were
. iSsued pursuant to section 7805(a)." 154 That initial reac·' . tion may ultimately be correct, but I want to explore it a
bit'more deeply before accepting it.
""'. 'It probably pointless to' dispute the second condition, .but there may be grounds on which to question
}Yl,l~ther Congress delegated to lreasury the power to
. ma~e .a !111e extending the six-year limitations period to
taXdeficiencies attributable to overstated basis. Below we
t~W4i~~r three perspectives: (1) the significance for del··.;.:~;:\:'..,.} ~g1alion purposes of lreasury's failure to use the notice·.,.:JLsJ :·~~:c<>,mme~t p rocess for the. temporary r7~lations, . (2)
·' / ···' • · ~~~er section 7805(a) constitutes an explicit ~elegation

is

. ,,;-/.

he sees Supreme Court deference jurisprudence as "a confus. !vmuddle of decisions which turn on internecine disputes,
Ji'Ckfilling from the desired result, and flavor-of-the-week analyticalmodelsJ' Id. at 262. See also Note, "Justifying the Chevron
:Poctrine: Insights From the Rule of Lenity," 123 Harv. L. Rev.
Z043;. 2043 (2010). ("Where Chevron deference was once the
b~fkR,:ound presumption, it is becoming the exception.")
,~1 :E.g., William R. Andersen, "Against Chevron: A Modest
roposal," 56 Admin. L. Rev. 957, 964-969 (2004); Jack M.
B.~erman; "End the Failed Chevrvn Experiment Now: How
f:/Jevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled,"
42.:Conn. L. Rev. 779, 783 (2010). ("Currently, the application of
th.e Chevron doctrine is highly unpredictable, and the decision
·t5elf.is.cited for opposing propositions.")
·~~In this, I proceed in the same spirit as a. prominent
-· rican theologian, who described one of his books as "an
ei:npt at a partial exploration. Its significance, if any, lies in the
brc'es it draws into the questioning." Ewert H. Cousins,
· t..oj.t/ie 21st Century (1998).
.. E.g., United States v: Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237 (2001). In
·. evron literature, this dimension is sometimes called Chevep l .S. because it fits between step one and step two. See
·
g, supra note 139, at 44 and n.232.
54
See IRS brief, supra note 1, at 24.

in this case, and (3) whether Congress implicitly delegated the power by leaving a gap in sections 6229 and
6501 for Treasury to fill.

A. Failure to Use Notice-and-Comment
. The Supreme Court justices have been split between
those who want to implement Chevron using bright lines
and those who prefer facts-and-circumstances approaches.155 So far, the latter group has prevailed, adding
to the Chevron muddle.
One particularly strong indicator of Chevron's applicability is that the agency's position went through the
notice-and-comment process. In Mead, the Court said that
the requisite delegation "may be shown in a variety of
ways, as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication
or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by sorrie other
indication of a comparable congressional intent."156 Some
nuance is needed to connect this statement to the two
p redicates for Chevron's applicability. If Congress required an agency to make a particular rule through the
notice-and-comment process that would bear on the first
predicate: that Congress delegated the particular power
to the agency. That the agency chose to go ·through that
process would bear on the second predicate: 'that the
agency was acting in the exercise of that delegated
power.157
Although the Mead statement suggests that noticeand-comment is one of several indicators of Chevron's
applicability,158 it is a particularly important one. Its
absence does not by itself render Chevron inapposite, but
it does create a hill fo climb. As one commentator noted:
By the end of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's
last term, the court had settled into a relatively
predictable dichotomy. The Court generally applied
Chevron deference if a rule had been adopted in
notice-and-comment proceedings, and otherwise
defaulted to [less deferential] analysis of various
persuasive factors to determine whether a less
formal agency interpretation warranted deference.1s9

155
This is well illustrated by the exchange between Justice
Breyer's concurrence and Justice Scalia's dissent in Brand X.
Compare 545 U.S. at 1003-1005 (Breyer, J.) with id. at 1014-1016
(Scalia, J.).
156533 U.S. at 227.
157
Cf. Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 173 (applying the
Chevron standard and emphasizing that the agency interpretation had been the product of notice-and-conunent even though
use of that process is not required for merely interpretive rules).
1ssro reinforce the point, Justice Breyer maintains that "the
existence of a formal rulemaking proceeding is neither a,necessary nor a sufficient condition for according Chevron deference. . . . It is not a necessary condition because an agency might
arrive at an authoritative interpretation of a congressional
enactment in other ways." Brand X, supra, 545 U.S. at 1004
(Breyer, J., concurring). In context, Justice Breyer appears to be
referring to notice-and-comment rulemaking although that is
usually described as informal, not formal, rulemaking. See, e.g.,
Alfred C. Aman Jr., Administrative Law and Process sec. 4.02 (2d
ed. 2006).
159
Goering, supra note 139, at 20; see also id. at 47.
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Thus, Treasury's decision to skip notice-and-comment
undercuts the argument for delegation in this case. This
perspective is not dispositive, but does create the need if the regulations are to be sustained - to identify "some
other indication of.a comparable congressional intent" to
delegate to Treasury the power to create this binding rule.
Whatever the merits of this perspective, it is easy to
understand why the Intermountain majority did not advance such an argument. Because the temporary regulations were simultaneously published in proposed
form, 160 regulations objection would disappear once the
notice-and-comment process is complete. It would not
accomplish the majority's apparent goal of invalidating
the regulations for all cases, whether litigated yet or not.
B. Explicit Delegation
The explicit delegation portion of the argument involves analysis that I will develop more fully in a future
article. In brief, I believe that, to date, our dichotomization of tax regulations has been misdirected. As discussed
in Section III.A.2, tax practitioners are accustomed to
classifying regulations as either specific authority or
general authority. I think we should drop these labels. It
would be more helpful to refer to the precise statutory
language by which Congress delegated power to write
particular regulations. If one were to do that, it could be
argued that the language of section 7805(a) is insufficient
to delegate to Treasury power to write the new regulations. These propositions are explored below.
1. Inadequacy of the traditional distinction. Numerous
cases distinguish between specific authmity and general
authority regulations, and recite the boilerplate proposition that the former are entitled to greater deference than
the latter. 161 This distinction is of dubious value and
should be eliminated for three reasons.
First, the traditional distinction is deceptive. P 62 and
others 163 doubt that reality matches the rhetoric. If a court
dislikes a regulation, it probably will find a way to
invalidate it even if it is specific authority in nature. 164 If
a court likes a regulation, it probably will find a way to
uphold it even if it is general authority in nature. 165 I

16°Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,354 (Sept.
28, 2009).
161 E.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24-25
(1982); Helvering v. R.J. Retjnolds Co., 306 U.S. 110, 114 (1939).
162Steve R. Johnson, "Swallows as It Might Have Been:
Req:&ations Revising Case Law," supra note 4.
63 E.g., Boris I. Bittker, Martin J. McMahon Jr., and Lawrence
A. Zelenak, Federal Income Taxation of Individuals, 46-5 (3d ed.
2002); Asimow, supra note 89, at 357; Mitchell Rogovin and
Donald L. Korb, "The Four R's Revisited: Regulations, Rulings,
Reliance and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View From
Within," Taxes, Aug. 2009, p. 21, at 22.
164Specific authority regulations sometimes have been invalidated by the courts. E.g., Rite Aide Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001), superseded in part by American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004, P.L. 108-357, section 844, 118 Stat. 1418,
1600; Phillips Petroleum v. Commissioner, 70 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir.
1995) (unpublished opinion); Estate of Bullard v. Commissioner, 87
T.C. 261 (1986).
165"Even if we regard the challenged regulation as interpretive because it was promulgated under.section 7805(a)'s general

cannot recall a case in which the court said in essence
"We're invalidating this general authority regulation, bu~
we would have upheld it had it been specific authority in
nature." If there are such cases, they are rare.
Second, the traditional distinction is unnecessary. In
part, courts are motivated to intone the traditional distinction out of respect for Congress. Section 7805(a)
covers the entire code, and yet Congress has written more
than a thousand specific authority provisions. 166 There
must be some reason why Congress writes specific
authority provisions. If section 7805(a) effects complete
delegation, aren't the numerous specific authority provisions mere surplusage? 167 According specific authority
regulations nominally higher dignity than general authority regulations avoids the surplusage problem and
any implied derogation of the work of Congress.
But we need not create a legal fiction to avoid such

lese-majeste. One reason, described below, is that specific
authority provisions usually are worded differently than
section 7805(a). There is no surplusage when sections do
different things or convey different commands.16s
There is another reason the legal fiction is unnecessary.
Surplusage appears problematic when one assumes that
Congress, through its legislation, is speaking only to the
courts as the statutes' interpreters. But this onedimensional model is flawed. A legislature speaks not
just to the courts but also to several different "interpretive cornmunities."169
.One such community is the agency charged with
administering the statute in question: Indeed, agencies
typically interpret statutes earlier and more often than
courts do,170 a fact that abates surplusage concerns. A
specific authority provision - even if worded identically
to section 7805(a) - can be understood as Congress
instructing Treasury, not the courts, that Congress is

rulemaking grant ... we must still treat the regulation with
deference." Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 447 (2003);
see also Nathe/ v. Commissioner, No. 09-1955, 2010 WL 2183960, at
*5 (2d Cir. June 2, 2009), Doc 2010-12160, 2010 TNT 106-12;
McNamee v. Department of the Treasunj, 488 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir.
2007), Doc 2010-12575, 2010 TNT 101-13. In fact, the great
majority of challenges to general authority tax regulations fail.
166See Coverdale, supra note 12, at 52.
167As examples of the judicial reluctance to find surplusage
in legislative enactments, see Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537
U.S. 51, 63 (2003); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501
U.S. 104, 112 (1991).
168E.g., Connecticut Nat'! Bank v. Gennain, 503 U.S. 249, 253
(1992).
16 See, e.g., William S. Blatt, "Interpretive Communities: The
Missing Element in Statutory Interpretation," 95 Nw. U. L. Rev.
629, 641-649 (2001).
170Substantial literature now exists as to statutory interpretation by agencies. E.g., Jerry Mashaw, "Norms, Practices, and
the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry Into Agency
Statutory Interpretation," 57 Admin. L. Rev. 501 (2005); Nathaniel
L. Nathanson, "Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation
of Statutes," 3 Vand. L. Rev. 470 (1950).

(Footnote continued in next column.)
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particularly interested in action on this front, or to
reassure Treasury that there's political support for attending to this matter. m
Third, and most important, the traditional distinction
deflects the attention of the cou rts from the precise
language of the statute containing the specific authorization. The traditional distinction lumps specific authority
statutes into one category regardless of the fact that such
statutes often word their delegations differently. Congress would be better honored by giving effect to, rather
than largely disregarding, textual differences.
2. Textually nuanced interpretation. Section 7805(a) confers on T~~asury general autliority to "prescribe all need~ rules and regulations for the enforcement of" the
code. Many specific authority provisions use identical or
similar language.
But many other specific authority provisions use different language from section 7805(a). For example:
· • Treasury "is authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be nec~ssary or appropriate to determine whether an interest in a corporation is to be
· treated ... as stock or indebtedness." 172
,. : • Trea~ury shall prescribe such regulations as may be
necessary or appropriate to prevent the avoidance of
subsection (a).'11 73
/1

• Treasury "may by regulations exempt" designated
types of organizations from the general rules . of
"this section."174
• Treasury "may issue regulations or othei; guidance
providing for adjustmen t of the [rule generally
prescribed by the section) on the basis of geographic
differences in housing costs."175
·'. • Treasury "may by regulations provide that other
restrictions (in addition to those identified in the
.,,,-;__ . statute] . shall be disregarded in d etermining the
value of" transferred property.116
• Treasury "shall prescribe rules which reaJ.locate
items of income, deduction, credit, exclu sion, or
other allowance to the extent necessary to prevent
the avoidance of tax imposed by reason of this
paragraph. [Treasury] may prescribe rules which
exclude from the tax imposed by subsection (a)

171Neither of these messages, however, need translate into
greater judicial deference for specific authority regulations. Both
just encourage Treasury to act. They do not guarantee that
Congress or the courts will endorse the substantive content of
~hatever regs are ultimately promulgated.
172
· •
Section 385(a); see also section 469(1) (Treasury "shall
prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate
to carry out provisions of this section, inclucling regulations" to
carry out five enumerated functions); section 585(b)(3) (Treasury
~'shall define the term loan and prescribe such regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this section");
, section 777, section 1202(k), and section 1446(f).
173
Section 504(b).
174
Section 508(c)(2).
175
'
Section 9ll(c)(2)(B).
176Section 2704(b)(4).
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amounts attributable to mileage awards which are
used other than for transportation of persons by
air."177
• "Nothing in the regulations prescribed for purposes
of chapter 24 (relating to income tax withholding)
which provides an exclusion from 'wages' as used in
such chapter shall be construed to require a similar
exclusion from 'wages' in the regulations prescribed
for purposes of this chapter" relating to employment taxes.178
• Treasury "shall prescribe such regulations as [it]
may deem necessary in order that the tax liability of
any affiliated group of corporations making a consolidated return and of each corporation in the
group ... may be returned, determined, computed,
assessed, collected, and adjusted, in such manner as
clearly to reflect the income-tax liability and the
various factors necessary for the determination of
such liability, and in order to prevent avoidance of
such liability. In carrying out the preceding sentence, [Treasury] may prescribe rules that are different from the provisions of chapter 1 that would
apply if such corporations filed separate returns."179
Hundreds of other examples could be added, but
those given above reveal several patterns: (1) some
delegations allow Treasury to write rules of an interstitial
or implemental nature to carry out the section
its
purposes, broadly defined; (2) other delegations are more
restrictive, limiting the scope of the delegated power to
particular objects; (3) other delegations allow Treasury to
define key statutory terms not defined by the statute
itself; (4) others allow Treasu ry to suspend or alter results
commanded by the statute; and (5) some provisions
direct Treasury to act, some permit Treasury to act, and
some prohibit Treasury from acting.
Some of these variations are the result of deliberate
choices and careful drafting, and courts should respect
such legislative decisions. 1so In some instances, the language employed may have been the product of less care,
but I believe that the statutory language should usually
(perhaps always) be respected even in such situations.
Courts frequently contrast language at issue with other
statutory language that more clearly expresses the outcome urged by a party. They do so to maintain that
"Congress knows how to say" something when it wish es
to convey that meaning.181 This approach sometimes
ascribes deliberation to accidents of drafting. Though it is
sometimes a fiction, it is a useful fiction. A similar spirit

or

177Section 4261(e)(3)(C).
178Section 312l(a) (flush language).
179Section 1502.
18011rn our constitutional system, it is widely assumed that
.. . federal judges must act as Congress's faithful agents" in
interpreting statutes. John F. Manning, Absurdity Doctrine,"
116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2393-2394 (2003); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
"Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State," 103 Harv. L. Rev.
405, 415 (1989).
181E.g., Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 476 (2003);
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164,
176-177 (1994).
/1
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should apply to interpretation of varying statutes delegating tax rulemaking power to the Treasury.
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This ap proach respects Congress and the separation of
powers principle. As has been observed in another context, "If Congress enacted into law something different
from what it intended, then it should amend the statute
to conform to its intent. It is beyond our province to
rescue Congress from its drafting errors.... This allows
both of our branches to adhere to our respected, and
respective constitutional roles."1s2 Few, if any, principles
of statutory interpretation are absolute, of course, and the
courts have "corrected" apparent drafting errors under
the absurdity, scrivener's error, and other doctrines.183
However, no less staunch a purposivist than Justice
Steve~s has observed that adherence to text is particularly rmportant in areas involving "technical and complex laws,"184 a characterization that fits our tax statutes.
. The traditional dichotomy proceeds categorically, paymg more heed to the specific authority versus general
authority categorization than to textual divergences
among dilferent specific authority delegations. This approach should be replaced with greater attention to
statutory language.
3. Application to the 'overstated basis' regulations. Did
Congress explicitly, th.rbugh section 7805(a), delegate to

Treasury the power to extend the six-year limitations
period to basi~ overstatements?t85 One could argue that
the ariswer is no. That section authorizes regulations for
the enforcement of the code. Arguably that contemplates
enforcement of code sections within the ambits already
set by Congress, not enlargement of those ambits. If
future decisions follow this reasoning, Chevron is not
triggered in Intermountain-type cases by an explicit delegation.

182

l

l.ilmie v. United Stales Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., writing for a unanimous Court); see also Gorospe v.
Commissioner, 451 F.3d 966, 969-970 (9th Cir. 2006).
183
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Philip P. Frickey, and
Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Stat11ton; Interpretation 267-271
(2d ed. 2006); Steve R Johnson, "The 'Absurd Results' Doctrine
in State and Local Tax Cases," State Tax Notes, Oct. 19, 2009, p.
195, Doc 2009-21703, or 2009 SIT 199-4.
184
St. Mnrlin Evarigelical Lutheran Ch urch v. South Dakota, 451
U.S. 772, 791 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
18
51ne IRS, of course, Utinks that there is no extension, that
th~ resu.lt is consistent with the statutes as they stand. See IRS
brief, supra note l, at 10. The reason the new regulations were
ne.eded, however, is that most courts disagree with the IRS on
this point.

C. Implicit Delegation
If an explicit delegation does not support the section
6501/6229 regulations, an implicit delegation probably
doesn't either. An implicit d elegation may existl& when a
gap in a statute reasonably implies that Congress intended the agency to fill the gap. 1B7 H owever, courts are
reluctant to find gaps in, or to allow supplementation or
modification of, statutes that are long, detailed, or intricate.188 Supposed implicit Chevron delegations have.been
rejected on this basis. 189 Section 6501(e) is a detailed and
carefully articulated provision.

VI. Conclusion
The Tax Court's Intermountain decision surely is not
the last shot that will be fired in the overstated basis
statute of limitations battle. The government has appealed Intermountain, and the validity and applicability
of the new regulations will surely be tested in future
cases.
Based on the above analysis, the temporary regulations should continue to be invalidated. Leaving aside
the conside.rations in Section V, however, once the regulations h ave been finalized following completion of
notice-and-comment, they should be upheld, particularly
if applied only prospectively. Taxpayers who already
have won their cases should be safe, but taxpayers whose
cases have not yet been decided will be in jeopardy.
As important as the particular issue is to tax administration, the wider dimensions of Intermountain and
related future cases may ultimately be of greater import.
The aspects elaborated above are only some of the
interesting matters raised by lntermountain. The case is a
treasure trove for those interested in tax procedure, and
we can eager 1y anticipate future decisions on the validity
of the basis overstatement statute of limitations regulations. Perhaps abo.ve all, Intermountain and related future
decisions may help shake us out of our professional
insularity and convince us that tax practitioners and
scholars discount general administrative law only at peril
to their professional competence.

186
The precise role of implicit delegations in the ·Clievro11
scheme has been debated for years. See, e.g., Goering, supra note
139, at 45; Kristin E. Hick.man, "The Need for Mead: Rejecting
Tax Exceptionalism in Judida.l Deference," 90 Min11. L. Rev. 1537,
1549-1550 (2006).
187
E.g., Mor/011 v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974), quoted by
Chevron, s11pra, 467 U.S. at 843-844.
188
E.g., United States v. Brocknmp, 519 U.S. 347, 350-352 (1997);
Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 579 {1965).
189
E.g., ABA v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 469 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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